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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
STEPHEN K. VANCE, : 
Case No. 20001151-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the district court erred in failing to give jury instructions requested by Mr. 
Vance? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court committed error in refusing to give a 
requested jury instruction is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. 
State v. Kruger. 6 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Utah 2000), citing State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 
238 (Utah 1992). 
B. Whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Vance's due 
process rights in failing to evaluate the Ramirez factors before permitting in-court 
identifications by the eyewitnesses? 
Standard of Review: "In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit, we defer to 
the trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's decision to admit and by reversing its factual findings only if they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted). "[Wjhether these facts [found by the district court ] are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Id 
(citations omitted). 
C. Whether the trial erred and abused its discretion in permitting in-court 
identifications that were unreliable? 
Standard of Review: Same as B. 
D. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defense's motion for a directed verdict 
and to dismiss with regard to the charges alleging M.P. as a victim? 
Standard of Review: A jury verdict will only be reversed when, "after viewing 
the evidence all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [the 
court] find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. 
Lopez. 2001 UT App. 123, If 10 (Utah Ct. App. April 12, 2001). Furthermore, to support 
a claim for insufficient evidence on appeal, the defendant must marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and demonstrate how the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the disputed findings. 
See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, amend XIV 
Utah Constitution, article I, § 7 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Stephen Vance was charged with three counts of lewdness with a child stemming 
from an incident on May 15, 1999, wherein Mr. Vance is alleged to have exposed himself 
to three girls under the age of fourteen. (R. 2-4.) At arraignment, the Honorable Judge 
Joseph Fratto appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) to represent 
Mr. Vance. (R. 14.) At the pretrial conference, the matter was set for jury trial on 
November 30, 1999. (R. 22.) On November 22, 1999, defense counsel requested a bail 
reduction and the jury trial was continued. (R. 22-24.) On January 25, 2000, Mr. Vance 
and defense counsel appeared for trial and requested a continuance, which the court 
denied. The case proceeded to jury trial wherein Mr. Vance was convicted of three 
counts of lewdness with a child, as charged. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1999, an information was filed in the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, charging Stephen K. Vance 
with three counts of lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (1953, as amended). (R. 2-4.) The charges arose from an 
incident on May 15, 1999, wherein Mr. Vance was alleged to have exposed his genitals to 
three girls under the age of 14. (R. 4.) 
On October 18, 1999, Mr. Vance appeared before the Honorable Joseph Fratto for 
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arraignment on these charges. Mr. Vance pled not guilty and the matter was set for 
pretrial conference on November 1, 1999. The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
was appointed to represent Mr. Vance. When Mr. Vance appeared for the pretrial 
conference on November 1, 1999, the matter was set for jury trial on November 30, 1999. 
On November 22, 1999, the court agreed to reduce Mr. Vance's bond from 
$10,000 to $5,000 and ordered that Mr. Vance be supervised through Pretrial Services. 
The jury trial date was then reset to December 14, 1999. On December 14, 1999, a case 
higher in priority than Mr. Vance's went forward to trial and as a result, Mr. Vance's case 
was rescheduled for jury trial on January 25, 2000. On January 11, 2000, based on 
representations by the deputy district attorney, Byron "Fred" Burmester, that he may be 
seeking an in-person lineup, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress any in-court 
identifications and to preclude Mr. Vance from having to appear at an in-person lineup. 
On January 25, 2000, numerous trials were set to be heard, including 
approximately nine cases which were higher in priority than Mr. Vance's based on the 
alleged violation date. Throughout the week prior to trial, defense counsel contacted both 
the court and Mr. Burmester in an attempt to ascertain whether or not Mr. Vance's case 
would be heard on January 25th. Mr. Burmester informed both the court and defense 
counsel that a case involving private counsel would be proceeding on January 25th and 
would result in Mr. Vance's case being continued. Defense counsel confirmed this 
information on Friday, January 21st with Mr. Burmester and with the court, and left a 
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message for Mr. Vance informing him that his trial would not proceed as scheduled on 
January 25th. At approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 24th, defense counsel contacted the 
court regarding a different matter and was informed that the court had received word from 
Mr. Burmester that the case involving private counsel had settled and that Mr. Vance's 
case would instead be proceeding. Defense counsel immediately contacted Mr. Vance 
and informed him of the change but assured him that every attempt would be made to 
obtain a continuance of the case. 
On the morning of January 25, defense counsel explained the past days' events to 
the court and requested a continuance, which the court denied. (R. 144:19-20.) Defense 
counsel also argued the motion to suppress any in-court identifications of Mr. Vance, 
which the court also denied. (R. 144:7-14.) The jury pool was then brought into the 
courtroom and a six-person jury was selected to hear the case. (R. 144:53.) 
According to testimony adduced at trial, on May 15, 1999, M.S. and H.S., and 
their friend M.P.,1 accompanied Corina Swenson, M.S.'s and H.S.'s mother, to a park 
located at 7300 South 700 East, in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 144: 108.). While Corina 
Swenson watched her son play a baseball game, M.S., M.P. and H.S. awaited in Corina's 
van playing board games. (R. 144: 78, 97.) According to H.S., who is ten years old, a 
man pulled his car up next to the van. (R. 144: 78.) She looked over at the man and 
1
 Notably, M.P. neither testified nor appeared for trial, despite a subpoena issued 
for her appearance at the trial on January 25, 2000. 
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noticed that he was wearing short shorts and that his penis was exposed. (R. 144: 78-80.) 
According to H.S., the man was looking at the girls through the rearview mirror in his car. 
(R. 144: 79, 88.) According to M.S., who is seven years old, H.S. observed the man and 
then told the other girls to "look." (R. 144: 100.) The man did not masturbate or 
otherwise touch his genital area. (R: 144: 99-100.) 
Thereafter, M.S. and H.S. exited the van and informed their mother, Corina, that 
the man in the car parked next to their van had exposed his penis to them. (R. 144: 80, 
100.) Corina looked toward the van and saw the vehicle the girls were referring to. (R. 
144: 117.) Corina informed the other parents, including Denise and Harry Segura, what 
the girls had told her and asked them to call the police. (R. 144: 117-118.) 
As Corina walked toward the car with another parent, Bruce Benzon, the vehicle 
slowly pulled out of the parking lot. (R. 144: 117-18, 125.) Corina and Bruce followed 
the car on foot and were able to write down the vehicle's license plate number. (R. 144: 
117-18; 125-26.) When the police arrived, they obtained statements from the parents and 
the girls and were given the license plate number. (R. 144: 127, 135.) 
A week later, on May 23, 1999, Denise Segura, one of the parents who was present 
when the May 15th incident allegedly occurred, was present at the same park. (R. 144: 
188.) Ms. Segura saw the vehicle allegedly involved in the prior incident enter the park. 
(R. 144: 189-90.) Based solely on identification of the vehicle, not the driver, Ms. Segura 
told her husband, Harry, to call the police. (R. 144: 190.) In the interim, the driver of the 
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vehicle got out and sat on a park bench reading a book. (R. 144: 190-92.) 
Officer Proulx and Officer Egan responded to the park and with the assistance of 
the Seguras, located Stephen Vance sitting on the northeast side of the park. (R. 144: 
143.) The Seguras informed the officers that Mr. Vance had driven a grey Monte Carlo 
to the park. (R. 144: 143.) 
The officers approached Mr. Vance and began to interrogate him with regard to 
how he had arrived at the park and whether he owned a grey Monte Carlo. (R. 144: 144-
45.) Mr. Vance indicated that he had walked to the park and owned a truck which was 
still parked at the extended stay hotel where he was living. (R. 144: 169.) In his 
testimony, Mr. Vance explained that he had told the officer he did not drive to the park 
because he knew that his driver's license was suspended and his car registration had 
expired. (R. 144: 218.) Officer Egan ran a licence plate check and discovered that the 
grey Monte Carlo was registered to Mr. Vance. (R. 144: 143-45.) On this basis, Mr. 
Vance was arrested. (R. 144: 143-35.) 
Subsequently, Officer Nudd gathered together a photo lineup wherein Mr. Vance's 
driver's license photograph appeared in the #2 position of a six person lineup. (R. 144: 
158, 162.) Officer Nudd showed this lineup to M.S. and H.S. (R. 144: 159), Ms. Swenson 
(R. 144: 159), and Denise and Harry Segura. (R. 144: 159.) Another office showed the 
photo lineup to Bruce Benzon. (R. 144: 159-60.) Ms. Swenson could not identify the 
alleged perpetrator, but did narrow her suspicions down to two individuals shown in the 
7 
six-person photo lineup. (R. 144: 129.) M.S. picked out an individual in the #6 position 
of the photo lineup as the perpetrator (R. 144: 106), while H.S. did not identify anyone 
from the photo lineup as the perpetrator. (R. 144: 90.) Denise and Harry Segura 
similarly failed to identify Mr. Vance from the photo lineup as the perpetrator. (R. 144: 
194, 197-98, 207.) Ms. Segura did testify, however, that she informed the officer that the 
person in the #2 position "looked the most like" the perpetrator, but she could not 
conclusively say that the person depicted in the #2 position was the perpetrator. (R. 144: 
197-98.) When asked how she arrived at this determination, Ms. Segura admitted that she 
and her husband did so together through a process of elimination, expecting that the 
suspected perpetrator's photograph would appear somewhere in the photo lineup.2 (R. 
144: 197-98.) Ms. Segura further admitted that his identification of Mr. Vance in court 
was based primarily on seeing him in the park on May 22, not on May 15th, the date of the 
actual incident. (R. 144: 196-97.) Mr. Segura admitted the same, indicating that he 
recognized the car in the park on May 22 as the same car from May 15th, but that he did 
not recognize the driver as the same person. (R. 144: 203, 207.) Thus, none of the 
individuals who were presented with the photo lineup were able to identify Mr. Vance. 
Based on the inability of the witnesses to identify Mr. Vance through the photo 
lineup and the inherent unreliability of subsequent identifications, defense counsel moved 
2
 With respect to this issue, Ms. Segura testified: "Yeah. Based on my husband and I 
looking at the pictures, just kind of went like ruling out, you know, he wasn't bald and he wasn't 
young and then it came down to where we said, we think it's 2." (R. 144: 198.) 
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to suppress any in-court identifications. (R. 36-45.) Defense counsel argued that because 
none of the individuals pictured in the photo lineup would be present at trial other than 
Mr. Vance, any in-court identifications would be the product of recognition of Mr. Vance 
from the photo lineup and the juxtaposition of Mr. Vance and defense counsel seated in 
the courtroom on the day of trial, not because the alleged victims recognized Mr. Vance 
as the perpetrator. 
On the morning of trial, the court heard defense counsel's motion to continue and 
motion to suppress in-court identification. The court denied both motions and the matter 
proceeded to jury trial. 
Defense counsel invoked the exclusionary rule and all witnesses were sworn and 
then excluded from the proceedings. The jury heard testimony from H.S., M.S., Corina 
Swenson, Bruce Benzon, Officer Chad Egan, Officer Craig Proulx, Officer Keith Volpe 
and Detective Kimberly Nudd. At the conclusion of the testimony of these witnesses, the 
state rested. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, citing inter alia, insufficient 
evidence and identification issues. The court denied the motion and Mr. Vance then 
testified. Mr. Vance explained that it was not unusual for him to loan his vehicle out to 
friends who lived at an apartment complex where he provided maintenance services. Mr. 
Vance further testified that it was quite possible he had loaned his vehicle out on the 15th 
of May, as that was a normal working day for him and a day during which someone at the 
complex may have asked to use his vehicle. 
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The defense rested and renewed its motions for directed verdict and to dismiss. 
Defense counsel also objected to several jury instructions. The court denied defense 
counsel's motions and noted defense counsel's objections to the instructions. The jury 
then heard closing argument and retired to deliberate. During the course of deliberations, 
the jury submitted the following questions to the court: 
1. Is there information in the police report of clothing or inventory of 
clothing [of defendant] upon arrest? 
2. Where are the Peay's, particularly McKenzie P. [sic] Did they file a report, [sic] 
Is there a reason that this was not addressed? 
3. Why was there no people [sic] from the defendants [sic] apt. to prove he loans 
his car out? 
Louis Darger [juror] 
(R. 107) (attached hereto as Addendum D). 
The court informed counsel of these inquiries and requested input from both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel. Defense counsel urged the court to inform the jury of the 
burden of proof and to clarify that Mr. Vance had no burden of proving his innocence and 
that the state bore the entire burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 144: 
276-77.) Defense counsel noted that the third query by the jurors amounted to 
inappropriate burden-shifting and it was clear from the question that the jury did not 
understand the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. (R. 144:276-77.) The 
court declined to provide any additional information to the jury but responded to their 
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queries by informing them to reread the jury instructions. (R. 108.) 
Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Vance on all three counts 
of lewdness with a child, class A misdemeanors. (R. 110-112.) Sentencing was 
scheduled for March 6, 2000, and Mr. Vance was referred to Adult Probation and Parole 
for a presentence report. (R. 116.) On March 6, 2000, Mr. Vance failed to appear for 
sentencing and the court issued a $25,000 bench warrant. (R. 119-20.) Subsequently, 
Mr. Vance turned himself on December 6, 2000, and the court scheduled sentencing for 
December 14, 2000. (R. 119.) 
The court ordered that Mr. Vance serve one year in jail for each offense, to run 
consecutively, and that he pay a $1,500 fine for each offense. (R. 131.) The court further 
ordered that the sentence and fines be suspended and Mr. Vance be placed on probation 
under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole for three years, subject to the 
following conditions: (1) that Mr. Vance serve one year in jail, with credit for 43 days 
Mr. Vance previously served on this case; (2) no violations of the law; (3) compliance 
with Adult Probation and Parole conditions of probation; (4) completion of the ISP 
program; (5) that Mr. Vance complete all appropriate evaluations; and (6) that Mr. Vance 
pay all costs of supervision, counseling and treatment. (R. 131.) Defense counsel then 
motioned the court to stay imposition of Mr. Vance's sentence pending appeal. (R. 145: 
19.) The court denied defense counsel's motion and Mr. Vance was ordered to begin 
serving his sentence forthwith. (R. 145:19.) 
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On February 20, 2001, defense counsel filed a written motion with the district 
court for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. (R. at blue supp. 3/12/2001, 1-
12.)3 The court initially issued a written denial of the motion for a certificate of probable 
cause but then subsequently scheduled the matter for a hearing. (R. at blue supp. 
3/12/2001, 7.) On March 16, 2001, the court heard argument from both defense counsel 
and the state prosecutor and denied defense counsel's motion for the issuance of a 
certificate of probable cause. (R. at blue supp. 4/17/2001.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Vance was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to properly 
instruct the jury on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence when it became 
clear the jury did not understand these legal principles. Moreover, Mr. Vance was denied 
due process when the trial court refused to suppress any in-court identifications without 
conducting a thorough analysis of the eyewitness identifications pursuant to Ramirez. 
This is particularly true given that the identifications were unreliable. Finally, Mr. Vance 
was denied due process when he was convicted of lewdness with regard to M.P. where 
M.P. failed to appear for trial and the state presented insufficient evidence to warrant Mr. 
Vance's conviction with regard to M.P. 
3
 This motion is contained in a supplement to the record which was not numbered. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO GIVE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION 
The trial court committed error in failing to instruct the jury that an accused bears 
no burden of proving his or her innocence in a criminal trial and that the burden of 
proving an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is borne solely by the State. 
During the course of deliberations, the jury returned with three questions, one of 
which essentially asked why Mr. Vance had failed to call witnesses to prove his 
innocence. Specifically, the jurors asked: "Why was [sic] there no people from the 
defendants [sic] apt. to prove he loans his car out?11 The essence of Mr. Vance's defense 
was that he frequently lent his vehicle out to tenants at the Pinehurst apartment complex 
where he was employed as a maintenance person. Mr. Vance testified it was likely he 
had lent his vehicle to a tenant on the date of the offense and that therefore, while his 
vehicle was present at the scene of the offense on May 15, 1999, he was not. 
The question of whether a trial court commits error in refusing to give a requested 
jury instruction is a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. 
Krager, 6 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Utah 2000), citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 
(Utah 1992). Pursuant to Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the 
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. 
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in 
13 
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to 
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. 
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to 
the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in 
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the 
record. 
Here, the jury received written instructions explaining the state's burden of proof and the 
defendant's presumption of innocence. (R. 88-89) (attached hereto as Addendum E). 
Despite these instructions, the jury misunderstood the instructions or improperly applied 
them to the specifics of this case, as is evidenced by the burden-shifting questions 
returned by the jury mid-deliberations. (R. 107.) 
In a criminal case, due process requires that the prosecution prove every element 
of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. 
amend. V, XIV; State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 195 (Utah 1999) ("as both a state and 
federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that the prosecution 
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. 
Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process mandates that the prosecution 
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. 
Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State has burden of proving all 
elements of a crime); State v. Starks. 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) ("A fundamental 
precept of our criminal law is that the state must prove all elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1999) ("A defendant in a 
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criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted.11). 
Because the theory advanced by Mr. Vance at trial did not constitute an affirmative 
defense, Mr. Vance had no burden of presenting evidence or otherwise proving his theory 
of the case. Compare Swenson, 838 P.2d at 1138 (Imposing "on the prosecution the 
burden to disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, once 
the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense."). When the jury submitted a 
question to the judge which asked for an explanation of why Mr. Vance did not prove his 
theory of the case, defense counsel asked the court to either refer the jury back to specific 
instructions regarding the burden of proof and ask the jury to re-read the particular 
instruction or to verbally explain the presumption of innocence and burden of proof to the 
jury. (R. 144: 276.) Defense counsel argued that the jurors' question suggested that the 
jury was engaging in burden-shifting, requiring Mr. Vance to prove his innocence. (R. 
144: 277.) Clearly, the jurors' question reflected that the jury failed to comprehend both 
the burden of proof and to understand that it is the state which is charged with meeting 
that burden. The court declined both of defense counsel's suggestions and instead 
informed the jury to re-read all instructions previously provided by the court. (R. 108.) 
Utah courts have previously determined that "it 'is not error to refuse a proposed 
instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions.'" State v. Hamilton. 
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827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992), quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982). 
See also State v. Spencer. 28 Utah 2d 12, 497 P.2d 636 (1972); State v. Miller. 24 Utah 
2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970); State v. Martinez. 21 Utah 2d 187, 442 P.2d 943 (1968). 
However, this proposition has been adopted in cases where a trial court refused to give a 
requested instruction prior to the jury retiring for deliberations, not in cases involving a 
request for an instruction during deliberations. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 232 (trial court did 
not commit prejudicial error in declining to give proffered cautionary jury instruction 
regarding fingerprint evidence where fingerprint evidence is not subject to the same 
problems and special treatment as eyewitness testimony); Sessions, 645 P.2d at 643 (trial 
court did not commit prejudicial error in declining proffered diminished capacity 
instruction where jury was instructed on elements of offense, state's burden of proof, the 
effect of intoxication on intent to commit an offense, and the elements of the lesser 
included offense); Spencer, 497 P.2d at 636 (trial court did not commit prejudicial error in 
failing to instruct jury of right to disagree and refuse to surrender honest convictions 
regarding weight or effect of evidence for purpose of reaching agreement where such 
information covered by other instructions); Miller, 464 P.2d at 844 (no prejudicial error in 
trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction on intent to defraud where 
other instructions clearly incorporated defendant's requested instruction without 
defendant's emphasis); Martinez, 442 P.2d at 308 (no prejudicial error in trial court's 
refusal to give proffered instruction on alternative facts, conclusions and theories where 
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information cumulative and covered in other instructions). 
In cases where jurors submitted questions after initiating deliberations, the 
appellate courts seem more inclined to require a trial court to offer specific answers which 
correctly state the law. For example, in State v. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 406 P.2d 308 
(Utah 1965), the jury had retired to deliberate before returning to ask the judge some 
questions in a case involving the passing of a check without sufficient funds to cover the 
check amount. In response to the jurors' questions,4 the judge instructed the jury that the 
defendant must have money in the bank or an arrangement with the bank to pay it when 
he writes the check. On appeal, the Court found this instruction to be improper because it 
provided an erroneous statement of the law; if the evidence indicated the defendant had 
arranged to have money or credit in the bank at the time the check was presented for 
payment, any intent to defraud would be negated. The Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction rejecting the state's argument that the element of intent to defraud at the time 
of issuance was properly covered in the written instructions to the jury, and under the rule 
that all instructions should be considered together, no prejudicial error resulted. The 
Court noted: 
We recognize the validity of that rule generally. But like most rules, it is 
not so absolute that it can be invariably and arbitrarily given effect in all 
circumstances. It must be applied sensibly and reasonably in relation to the 
particular fact situation at hand. 
4
 There is nothing in the Coleman opinion reciting the questions the jurors asked of 
the judge. 
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Id at 310. 
In State v. Couch. 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1981), the jury was asked to determine 
whether, inter alia, the defendant had committed the offense of forcible sodomy. After 
the jurors had retired to deliberate, they asked the judge to further instruct them with 
regard to the definition of "genitals" as used in the forcible sodomy statute. Id. at 94. 
The judge refused to provide the jury with a definition of "genitals." On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure to provide the jury with a definition of 
word "genitals" constituted reversible error where application of the proper definition of 
the word was essential to the proper application of the forcible sodomy law. Id. at 94-95. 
In so holding, the Court pointed out that "where a jury at its own instance requests the • 
definition of a term whose understanding is essential to a proper application of the law, 
the trial judge must provide the requested definition." Id, at 95. See also People v. Alexis, 
794 P.2d 1029, 1031 ("When the jury indicates to the court that it does not understand 
some matter of law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court has an 
obligation to clarify that matter for the jury in a concrete and unambiguous manner."), 
reversed on other grounds, 806 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1991). In this analysis, "[t]he critical fact 
is that the jury has signified its lack of understanding of the meaning of a word it must 
apply in performing its function." Couch, 635 P.2d at 95. 
Similarly, here the jury asked a question which reflected its misunderstanding of 
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the standards it had to apply in order to properly perform its function: the presumption of 
innocence and the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under 
these circumstances, where the jury instructions set out the proper burden of proof and the 
presumption of innocence, yet the jury still failed to grasp those concepts or apply them to 
the specifics of the case, the trial court had an absolute duty to clearly and unambiguously 
instruct the jury that Mr. Vance had no burden to prove his innocence and/or refer the 
jury to the specific instructions which set forth the presumption of innocence and burden 
of proof. Because this error so fundamentally abrogated Mr. Vance's constitutional 
rights, the only appropriate remedy is a new trial. See, e.g. Couch, 635 P.2d at 95-96 
(failure to provide jury with requested definition was reversible error requiring remand 
for a new trial). 
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EVALUATE THE 
RAMIREZ FACTORS BEFORE PERMITTING IN-COURT 
IDENTIFICATIONS BY THE WITNESSES 
The trial court's failure to adequately evaluate the reliability of the eyewitness 
identifications before denying defense counsel's motion to suppress in-court 
identifications constitutes reversible error. In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence of eyewitness identification, this Court ndefer[s] to the trial court's fact-finding 
role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision to admit 
and by reversing its factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
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'[W]hether these facts are sufficient to demonstrate reliability is a question of law" which 
this Court reviews for correctness. Id. (Citations omitted). It is important to remember, 
however, that the prosecution always bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility 
of an eyewitness identification by laying "a foundation upon which the trial court can 
make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any necessary legal 
conclusions." Id at 778. (citations omitted). 
As the Ramirez Court noted, 
Potential for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional guarantees 
inheres in this overlap of responsibility of judge and jury to determine the 
same issue. Because the jury is not bound by the judge's preliminary 
factual determination made in ruling on admissibility, the trial court may be 
tempted to abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered 
evidence constitutional defects and may simply admit the evidence, leaving 
all questions pertinent to its reliability to the jury. But courts cannot 
properly sidestep their responsibility to perform the required constitutional 
admissibility analysis. To do so would leave protection of constitutional 
rights to the whim of a jury and would abandon the courts' responsibility to 
apply the law. The danger of such an abdication of responsibility is 
particularly serious where the admissibility of an eyewitness identification 
is concerned because of the probability that such evidence even though 
thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on a jury. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778 - 79 (citations omitted). 
In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 774, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a totality of the 
circumstances approach for determining the due process reliability of eyewitness 
identifications in accordance with Article I, section 7 of the Utah State Constitution.5 
5
 Because Utah has adopted rigorous due process analysis with respect to the 
constitutional reliability of eyewitness testimony that is arguably more rigorous than the 
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This approach requires consideration of, at minimum, the five factors set forth in 
Ramirez. kL at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)). If an eyewitness 
identification is unreliable pursuant to these factors, admission of the identification will 
deny a defendant due process. Id. at 779. Here, the trial court failed to address the 
factors set forth in Ramirez, inappropriately relegating that decision-making authority to 
the jury. The jury has no authority to decide questions of law. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel informed the court of her concerns that none of the 
witnesses presented with a six-person photo line-up could identify Mr. Vance as the 
perpetrator of the May 15, 1999, offense. (R. 144: 7-8.) Defense counsel objected to the 
eyewitnesses making an in-court identification due to their prior inability to identify Mr. 
Vance and the fact that he would be the only person from the photo line-up who would be 
present during trial. (R. 144: 8.) Defense counsel argued that any in-court identification 
would be inherently unreliable. (R. 144: 9.) 
The prosecutor argued that identification testimony is inadmissible only when 
witnesses lack the ability to see a perpetrator in the first instance. The prosecutor asserted 
that all witnesses observed the perpetrator for at least five minutes, in the daylight, at a 
federal analysis, the failure to meet the due process requirements of the Utah Constitution 
automatically renders the admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications a violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784. 
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distance of forty feet or less.6 (R. 144: 9-10.) For these reasons, the prosecutor objected 
to Mr. Vance's motion and asked that both the photo line-up and the in-court 
identifications be allowed. (R. 144: 11) 
Defense counsel responded by noting that the defense was not objecting to the 
admission of the photo line-up, but only to any in-court identifications. (R. 144: 11-12.) 
The court responded as follows: 
Well, and I think- - well, and I guess what I'm struck with here is 
that - - that these are matters for the jury to consider in terms of how good 
an identification is in Court. If the witness is asked to identify somebody, if 
they're able to do that, they're able to do that. And then as a matter of 
impeachment, if you will, that something has happened in the past that may 
taint that identification. 
Now, if it's as a result of an improper photo spread or line-up, I'm - -
then that shouldn't - - that certainly should be raised by way of a mo- - pre-
trial motion to consider that. And indeed, the conclusion could be to 
prohibit that witness from making that in-court identification because it has 
been tainted by something that's happened in the past. 
(R. 144: 12-13.) Following further argument from defense counsel, the court concluded: 
And I understand what you're saying, but I - - that's - - those factors, 
I mean, I'm not able to conclude as a matter of law that because someone is 
sitting next to you, they're more likely to be identified. Those are indeed 
arguments, I suppose, to be made to the jury as impeachment of the 
witness' identification, not as a matter of law that, unless we had the - - all 
the people involved in the line-up and so forth, sitting next to you and so 
forth. 
6
 None of the witnesses testified to observing the perpetrator for more than a brief period 
of time. This factual error would have been corrected had the judge held a hearing wherein the 
witnesses would have been required to testify prior to trial and establish the length of time they 
actually observed the perpetrator. 
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So, your request to - - to quash or to somehow suppress the 
identification that a witness may or may not be able to be made is denied. 
(R. 144: 14.) 
The trial court's abject failure to make factual findings and evaluate those facts 
according to the Ramirez factors constitutes an abdication of the trial court's 
responsibility as gatekeeper. See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944-945 (Utah App. 
1997) (M[W]hen presented with the issue of the constitutional admissibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony, a trial court must resolve factual disputes, consider the Ramirez 
reliability factors, and legally determine whether the eyewitness identification is 
reliable."). In this context, the trial court's gatekeeping responsibility requires resolution 
of whether the identification passes constitutional muster. If it does, the matter is 
submitted to the jury; if it does not, the identification is excluded as a matter of law. Id. at 
943. Such abdication left all questions regarding the reliability of the eyewitness 
identifications to the jury. In doing so, the trial court left protection of Mr. Vance's 
constitutional rights to the whim of a non-law trained jury of laypersons and abandoned 
its responsibility to apply the law. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have 
at least made factual findings based on the Ramirez factors or more preferably, held a 
hearing on defense counsel's motion prior to trial. Such a hearing would have provided 
the trial court with adequate factual information to make a determination of the 
admissibility of the eyewitness identifications in this matter prior to the issue ever being 
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placed before the trier of fact. The failure to hold such a hearing or make such factual 
findings constituted an abdication of the trial court's gatekeeping responsibility and 
primary role as arbiter of legal issues. This refusal to perform clear judicial duties 
resulted in the denial of Mr. Vance's constitutional rights. Such a violation of essential 
constitutional rights demands reversal of Mr. Vance's conviction. 
Ill PURSUANT TO THE RAMIREZ FACTORS, THE IN-COURT 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS WERE NOT RELIABLE AND 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
Applying the factors outlined in Ramirez, the in-court eyewitness identifications of 
Mr. Vance were wholly unreliable and therefore should have been suppressed by the trial 
court at the outset. In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 774, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a 
totality of the circumstances approach for determining the due process reliability of 
eyewitness identifications in accordance with Article I, section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution. This approach requires consideration of the following factors: 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) 
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an 
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, 
and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's." 
Id at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)). If an eyewitness 
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identification is unreliable pursuant to these factors, admission of the identification will 
deny a defendant due process. IdL at 779. 
A. OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW THE ACTOR DURING THE EVENT 
The first factor to be evaluated is the opportunity of the witnesses to view the 
perpetrator during the alleged event. Circumstances include "the length of time the 
witness [es] viewed the actor; the distance between the witness and the actor; whether the 
witness could view the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were 
distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other circumstances 
affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the actor." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
i Length of Time the Witnesses Observed the Actor 
At trial, H.S. did not indicate how long she was able to observe the man who 
exposed himself to her. (R. 144: 78-79.) H.S. testified that the man's car pulled up next 
to the van she was sitting in and was there for twenty minutes to an hour before she 
noticed that his genitals were exposed. (R. 144: 78-79.) As soon as she noticed the man 
was exposing himself, she told the other girls in the van what she had seen. (R. 144: 79-
80.) The girls stayed in the van for an undetermined period of time and then went and 
told Corina Swenson. (R. 144: 80.) 
At trial, M.S. was also unable to indicate how long she was able to observe the 
man who exposed himself to her. (R. 144: 98-100.) She simply testified that the man 
drove his car up next to their van and it was only when H.S. said something that she 
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looked over and the saw the man exposed his genitals. (R. 144: 100.) As previously 
noted, M.P. was not present at trial and therefore did not testify. 
Corina Swenson, mother of H.S. and M.S., testified that she saw the man who was 
in the car next to her van near the bathrooms prior to the incident. (R. 144: 113.) She 
indicated that she noticed the man near the bathrooms but quickly entered and exited the 
bathroom so did not get a long look at him. (R. 144:113-15.) Later, when the girls 
approached her about the man exposing himself to them, Corina testified that she could 
see the man from about forty feet away backing his car out of the parking lot. (R. 144: 
109-10.) Corina testified that she identified the man in the car as the man she had seen by 
the restroom from this forty foot distance by his moustache and his sunglasses. (R. 144: 
117, 134-35.) Corina further testified that when the man was in the car she saw him from 
the side, not the front. (R. 144: 137.) Thereafter, Corina and her friend Bruce followed 
the vehicle on foot, viewing the rear of the vehicle as it drove out of the parking lot. (R. 
144: 118-19.) 
Denise Segura, a parent who was at the park on May 15, 1999, for one of her 
children's baseball games also testified that she saw the man in the gray car. (R. 144:182-
83.) She indicated she saw the man sitting in the passenger seat of his car. (R. 144:183.) 
Ms. Segura indicated she made brief eye contact with the man and only saw him from the 
shoulders up. (R. 144:183-84.) Ms. Segura testified that she "glanced" at the man and 
that was the extent of the time she saw the man. (R. 144:187.) 
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ii Distance Between the Witnesses and the Actor 
H.S. did not indicate the distance between herself and the man, aside from 
testifying that the man was in a car parked next to her van and that she saw him looking at 
her through his rearview mirror. (R. 144:78-79.) H.S. could not remember whether she 
actually saw the man's face through the mirror or directly. (R. 144: 89.) M.S. also failed 
to indicate the distance between herself and the man, aside from testifying that the man 
was parked in a car next to her van and she saw him looking at her through his rearview 
mirror. (R. 144: 98-100, 105.) 
Corina Swenson testified that she saw the man near the bathrooms prior to the 
exposure incident. (R. 144:113.) She indicated that when she noticed the man she was 
about ten to fifteen feet away from the man. (R. 144:115.) Later, when the girls 
approached her about the man exposing himself to them, Corina testified that she could 
see the man from about forty feet away backing his car out of the parking lot. (R. 
144:109-10.) Corina testified that she identified the man in the car as the man she had 
seen by the restroom from this forty foot distance by his moustache and his sunglasses. 
(R. 144:117,134-35.). Corina further testified that when the man was in the car she saw 
him from the side, not the front. (R. 144: 137.) Thereafter, Corina and her friend Bruce 
followed the vehicle on foot, viewing the rear of the vehicle as it drove out of the parking 
lot and having a view only of the back of the man's head. (R. 144: 118-19.) 
Denise Segura testified that she pulled her car up next to the gray car in which the 
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man was sitting in the passenger seat, making brief "eye contact" with him. (R. 144:182-
83.) 
iii Whether the Witnesses Could View the Actor's Face 
It is questionable whether H.S., M.S., and M.P. could see the man's face. H.S. 
testified that she saw the man's face, described that he had on sunglasses, had a 
moustache and had curly hair. (R. 144:78.) However, when asked if she had seen the 
man's face directly or only through the rearview mirror, H.S. was unable to say. (R. 144: 
89.) When asked if she could describe what the man looked like, M.S. stated: "No." (R. 
144: 98-99.) 
Corina Swenson testified that she was able to see the man's face when he was 
standing by the bathroom and that she could see a side-view of his face as he was pulling 
out of the parking lot. (R. 144:113, 117, 135-36.) Denise Segura testified that she briefly 
glanced at the man's face, but he was wearing sunglasses and had a moustache. (R. 
144:183-84,187.) 
iv Lighting or Lack Thereof 
There is no dispute that this incident occurred during the daytime and that lighting 
was not an issue. However, it is important to note that the girls were inside a car, as was 
the perpetrator, so certainly the lighting inside the vehicles was not as good as the lighting 
outside of the vehicles. 
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v Presence or Absence of Distracting Noises or Activity During the 
Observation 
At the time of the observations made by H.S. and M.S., there were multiple 
baseball games in progress. (R: 144: 75-76, 97.) Also, the girls were in the middle of 
playing board games inside the family minivan. (R. 144: 78, 97.) Corina Swenson 
testified that when she saw the man by the bathrooms, there were many people entering 
and exiting the building. (R. 144:114.) When Corina saw the man in the car, her son's 
game was still in progress and when Denise saw the man, the baseball games were also in 
progress. (R. 144:180.) Moreover, Denise was preoccupied with her young son who was 
four years old and who was asleep in the backseat of her car. (R. 144:181-82.) 
B. VICTIMS' DEGREE OF ATTENTION TO THE PERPETRATOR 
The second reliability factor in Ramirez involves analysis of the victims' degree of 
attention to the perpetrator. As previously noted, H.S. and M.S. both testified that the 
man in the car had pulled up next to their van anywhere from 20 minutes to one hour 
prior to gaining their attention. It was only when H.S. observed the man exposing himself 
and told M.S. and M.P. that the girls noticed the man. Even then, the girls testified that 
they sat in the van for a little while and then went to tell their mother. While Corina 
testified that she noticed the man by the bathroom and identified him as the same person 
in the gray car, she did not give tremendous attention to the man by the bathroom, other 
than to notice him and make a decision that she was uncomfortable with him. As for 
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Denise Segura, she testified that she only saw the man briefly and therefore did not 
commit a great degree of attention to the man. 
C. CAPACITY TO OBSERVE ACTOR DURING EVENT 
The third reliability factor involves the witnesses' capacity to observe the actor 
during the event. Of particular importance is "whether the witness's capacity to observe 
was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, 
biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or 
alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (citing Long. 721 P.2d at 494 n.8). There is no 
indication from the evidence that any of these factors may have affected the ability of the 
witnesses to observe the perpetrator. 
D. SPONTANEITY OF IDENTIFICATION AND CONSISTENCY 
The fourth reliability factor is whether the identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter or whether it was a product of suggestion. Relevant 
circumstances include: 
the length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time 
of the event and the identification of defendant; the witness's mental 
capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification; the witness's 
exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information 
from other sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a 
description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the 




i Length of Time Between Event and Identification 
H.S., M.S., Corina Swenson and Denise Segura were shown a photo line-up over 
thirty days after the incident. (R. 144: 89-90.) H.S. could not identify Mr. Vance from 
the photographs and in fact did not believe any of the six persons depicted in the photo 
line-up looked familiar. (R. 144:90.) M.S. also viewed the photo line-up at the same 
time and identified a man in the number six position of the photo line-up as the man who 
exposed himself to her. (R. 144:102.) Mr. Vance was depicted in the number two 
position of the photo line-up. (R. 144:162.) Corina Swenson was shown the photo line-
up at the same time her daughters were shown the photographs. (R. 144:128.) Corina 
identified the individuals in position number 2 and 6 (R. 144:129.) Bruce Benzon, the 
parent who followed the vehicle out of the parking lot with Corina Swenson on the date 
of the incident, was shown a photo line-up four months after the incident and could not 
identify anyone from the line-up as the driver of the car. (R. 144:153-54.) Denise and 
Harry Segura were also shown the same photo line-up a few months after the incident. 
(R. 144:193.) Denise Segura testified that she and her husband failed to positively 
identify anyone from the line-up but that they kept returning to the person in the number 2 
position. (R. 144:197-98.) Denise admitted she could not say for sure the person in the 
number 2 position was the person from the park on May 15. (R. 144:197.) 
More than six months after the incident, despite the witnesses failure to positively 
identify Mr. Vance from the photo line-up, the witnesses were capable of positively 
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identifying Mr. Vance at trial when he was the only option to choose from. H.S. 
identified Mr. Vance (R. 144:86), as did M.S. (R. 144:103.) However, as defense counsel 
tried to point out, when M.S. was asked to look around the room to see if she could see 
the man who exposed himself to her, she look only at defense counsel table before saying 
that Mr. Vance was the man from the park. (R. 144:103.) Ms. Corina Swenson also 
testified at trial she too suddenly recognized Mr. Vance as the man from the park. (R. 
144:130.) Finally, Denise Segura identified Mr. Vance in court as well. (R. 144:194.) 
Harry Segura, Denise's husband, also identified Mr. Vance in-court. (R. 144:205.) 
However, Mr. Segura admitted that his identification of Mr. Vance stemmed from seeing 
Mr. Vance when he was arrested in the park on May 22, 1999, not based on seeing him in 
the park on May 15, 1999. (R. 144:207.) Bruce Benzon, who was shown the photo array 
in September of 1999, testified that he was unable to pick anyone out of the photo line-up. 
(R. 144:154.) 
ii Witness's Mental Capacity and State of Mind at Time of 
Identification 
When H.S. and M.S. saw the man expose himself to them, H.S. was ten years old. 
(R. 144:73.) M.S. was seven. (R. 144:92.) At the time of trial, H.S. and M.S. were the 
same ages. Aside from age, there is nothing to indicate that mental capacity or state of 
mind played any role in the inability of M.S. and H.S. to identify Mr. Vance from the 
photo line-up or in their ability to suddenly identify Mr. Vance at trial. Similarly, there is 
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nothing to indicate that mental capacity or state of mind played a role in the inability of 
Ms. Swenson, Ms. Segura, Mr. Segura and Mr. Benzon to identify Mr. Vance from the 
photo line-up or in the ability of Ms. Swenson and Ms. Segura to identify Mr. Vance as 
the man from the park on May 15, 1999, at the trial. 
Mi Witness's Exposure to Opinions, Descriptions, Identifications, or 
Other Information from Other Sources 
In the victim impact statement portion of Mr. Vance's presentence report, Corina 
Swenson informed the presentence investigator as follows: "She said it was her 
understanding the subject has done this before and feels he should not be allowed on the 
streets. Ms. Swenson said she would like to insure this doesn't happen to anyone else." 
(Confidential Exhibit 3.) At sentencing, defense counsel objected and expressed concerns 
that the witnesses were aware of this information prior to trial and that may have 
influenced their decision to identify Mr. Vance as the perpetrator of the offense. (R. 145: 
3-4.) Defense counsel clarified with the court that she had been unaware of the victims' 
knowledge of Mr. Vance's prior history until the presentence report was submitted for 
sentencing and that as such, sentencing was the first opportunity Mr. Vance had to object 
to the disclosure of that information. (R. 145: 4.) 
There is no doubt that if Ms. Swenson and the other adults were informed by 
police officers, the prosecutor, or any other arm of the state that Mr. Vance had a prior 
lewdness conviction, any subsequent identification would have been tainted by such 
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information. This is particularly true given that none of the witnesses were capable of 
picking Mr. Vance out of a photo lineup within a few months of the incident. If the 
witnesses were informed that the person arrested and charged with committing the 
lewdness offense had a prior history of lewdness offenses, such information would have 
been highly prejudicial and would have seriously impacted any identification made 
thereafter. Attempts by defense counsel to discover when the witnesses were informed of 
this information and by whom have been met with hostility. An investigator from LDA 
has made numerous attempts to contact the witnesses to discover when they became 
aware of Mr. Vance's prior conviction and who provided them with this information. 
(See Report attached hereto as Addendum C.) The witnesses have hung up on the 
investigator or otherwise refused to speak with him. At a minimum, Mr. Vance is entitled 
to a hearing to determine when the witnesses became aware of this information and if the 
information was obtained pretrial or during trial, Mr. Vance would be entitled to a new 
trial. 
Although Corina claimed at trial that she limited her discussions of the case with 
her daughters (R. 144: 133-34), her daughters' descriptions of the perpetrator are 
suspiciously similar to her description. In speaking with Officer Volpe on the date of the 
incident, the perpetrator was described by Corina, H.S. and M.S. as Ma gray haired mid 
40's [sic] male with green shirt and tan shorts. He had a moustache.1' (R. 41.) 
At trial, H.S. described the man who exposed himself to her as having sunglasses, 
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a moustache and curly hair. H.S. indicated the man was wearing short shorts and a green 
shirt. (R. 144: 78.) M.S. was unable to offer any description whatsoever of the man at 
trial. (R. 144: 98-99.) M.S., however, did admit that the prosecutor and her mom and dad 
had talked to her about what she was going to say in the courtroom. (R. 144: 104-05.) 
Corina's description of the man at trial was that he had on dark sunglasses, really short 
shorts and curly dark hair with some gray. (R. 144: 113-14.) Corina indicated that she 
does hair, so she is particularly aware of people's hair, and she noticed the waves in the 
back of the man's hair. (R. 144: 139-40.) Denise Segura testified that the man she saw in 
the gray car had dark graying hair, a moustache and sunglasses. (R. 144: 184.) 
At the time of the first identification, there was no mention of sunglasses or wavy 
hair. However, all of the witnesses suddenly remembered sunglasses and wavy hair when 
they testified at trial, more eight months after the incident occurred. Clearly, there was 
some discussion among the Swenson family internally and between the Seguras and the 
Swensons regarding the identification of the man in the park. 
Moreover, at trial, Harry Segura testified that he was able to identify Mr. Vance in 
court based on Mr. Vance's presence in the park on May 22, 1999, a week following the 
incident (R. 144: 207.) The defense did not dispute Mr. Vance's presence in the park and 
his arrest on May 22, 1999. Denise Segura, Harry's wife, testified that she and Harry 
came to form the belief that the person in the number two position of the photo lineup 
was the perpetrator based on a process of elimination, which they engaged in together. 
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(R. 144: 198.) Clearly the Seguras reached their identifications, both in the photo lineup 
and in court, through a process of elimination and discussion between themselves. Again, 
Mr. Segura's identification was admittedly based solely on his observation of Mr. Vance 
in the park on May 22, 1999. There is no doubt that his identification of Mr. Vance from 
May 22, influenced his wife's identification, which purportedly stemmed from seeing Mr. 
Vance on May 15, 1999. 
Accordingly, it appears the witnesses shared information regarding their 
descriptions of the perpetrator and came to a convenient consensus, not to mention that 
the witnesses were informed that Mr. Vance had a prior lewdness conviction. Certainly 
this information would seriously undermine the reliability of any in-court identification. 
iv Prior Inconsistent Descriptions of the Actor 
Because there was only one identification of the perpetrator given by the girls and 
Ms. Swenson, the only prior inconsistency although substantial is the fact that none of the 
witnesses could pick Mr. Vance out of the six person lineup showed to them a few 
months after the incident. 
v Circumstances Under Which Defendant Presented to Witness for 
Identification 
Despite the inability of the witnesses to pick Mr. Vance's photo from the six 
person photo lineup a few months after the incident, when Mr. Vance was the only man 
from the photo lineup present in the courtroom and sitting at defense counsel table, the 
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witnesses were all able to identify Mr. Vance in-court. Of course, there was nobody else 
for the witnesses to identify on the day of trial. Thus the Hobson's choice for the 
witnesses that day was to pick Mr. Vance or to pick no one at all. As previously noted, if 
the witnesses had been informed of Mr. Vance's prior conviction pretrial or during trial, 
then of course the witnesses would have no problem saying that Mr. Vance was the 
perpetrator of the May 15, 1999, offense, even if he was not. 
E. EVENT OBSERVED AND LIKELIHOOD OF REMEMBRANCE 
Fifth, and finally, an analysis of the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly is necessary 
to the determination of the reliability of an identification. This analysis includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Here, there is no doubt that this event was not an ordinary event in the minds of 
H.S. and M.S. However, both H.S. and M.S. were quite young when the incident 
occurred and they did not observe the man who exposed himself for any significant 
period of time. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that seeing a man by the restroom 
was an extraordinary event in Corina's life or anything that would cause her to more 
accurately perceive, remember and relate her identification of that man as the perpetrator 
of the offense. This is particularly so when Ms. Swenson's identification of the man by 
the bathroom as the same man in the car was based solely on seeing the man in the car 
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from at least a forty-foot distance and observing sunglasses and a moustache. With 
regard to Ms. Segura, seeing a man sitting in his parked car is not an extraordinary event 
that would cause a person to more accurately perceive, remember and relate the 
identification of the man in the car. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE'S MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND TO DISMISS WITH REGARD TO 
THE CHARGES ALLEGING M.P. AS A VICTIM 
The trial court committed error in failing to grant defendant's motion for directed 
verdict and/or to dismiss as to Count III of the information when the alleged victim, M.P., 
did not testify at trial. Without the testimony of Miss Peay, the state presented 
insufficient evidence to support a conviction on Count III. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court affords tremendous deference 
to a jury verdict. A jury verdict will only be reversed when, "after viewing the evidence 
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [the court] 
find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight 
and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. 
Lopez, 2001 UT App. 123, % 10 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2001); quoting State v. Silva. 
2000 UT App 292,1f 13, 13 P.3d 604 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2000). Furthermore, to 
support a claim for insufficient evidence on appeal, the defendant must marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and demonstrate how the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
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disputed findings. See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
The defendant was charged with three counts of lewdness involving a child, a class 
A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (1953, as amended). To 
convict Mr. Vance of each of these three counts, the State was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Vance intentionally or knowingly, in the presence of a child 
under 14 years of age, exposed his genitals or pubic area in a private place under 
circumstances the actor should have known would likely cause affront or alarm.7 Mr. 
Vance was charged with three counts because the alleged conduct occurred in the 
presence of M.P., H.S., and M.S., all allegedly children under 14 years of age. 
At trial, H.S. and M.S. both testified and were subject to cross-examination. (R. 
144: 72-106.) However, M.S. Peay, the alleged victim involved in Count III of the 
information was not present at the trial and did not testify. Furthermore, the State made 
7
 The elements discussed above are fact-specific. The exact wording from the 
information charging Mr. Vance reads as follows for each of the three counts: 
LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 7300 South 700 East, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about May 15, 1999, inviolation of Title 76, 
Chapter 9, Section 702.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
STEPHEN K. VANCE, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly do any of 
the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of age; performed an 
act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; exposed his genitals, the female breast below the top 
of the areola, the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area; in a public place; or in a private 
place; under circumstances the actor should have known would likely cause affront or 
alarm; or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; 
masturbated; engaged in trespassory voyeruism; caused a child under the age of 14 years 
to expose his or her genitals, anus, or breast, if female, to the actor, with the intent to 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; or performed any other act of 
lewdness. (R. at 5-7). 
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no attempt to have M.S. Peay designated as an unavailable witness. 
The marshaled evidence regarding Count III is as follows. At trial, H.S. testified 
regarding her view of the events of May 15, 1999. She explained that she was present at 
her brother's baseball game on that day with her family, including her sister M.S., as well 
as her friend M.P. (R. 144: 76.) H.S. was unable to tell the court the age of her friend 
M.P. When asked M.P.'s age, H.S. answered, "I think seven." (R. 144: 76.) H.S. went 
on to explain that her mother was watching the game from her chair by the bleachers 
while the three girls played games in the family van. (R. 144:77-78.) While playing board 
games, H.S. notice a "silver rusty car" pull up beside them with a white male inside the 
vehicle. H.S. testified that she "looked over the seat" and saw the man's penis. (R. 144: 
78.) She then told her sister and her friend what she had seen. When asked what 
happened after she told her sister and her friend, she replied, "[a]nd then we were kinda 
shocked, so we stayed in the car and after a little while, we went and told my mom." (R. 
144: 80). 
Next, H.S.'s sister M.S. testified regarding her recollection of May 15, 1999. She 
reiterated that she had gone with her family and her friend M.P. to her brother's baseball 
game on that date. (R. 144: 96.) M.S. testified that her friend M.P. was in the second 
grade and was seven years old. (R. 144:97.) She went on to explain that the three girls 
were playing board games in the family van. (R. 144:97.) While playing games in the 
van, M.S. testified that a man in a car pulled up to them and "flashed" them. (R. 144: 98-
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99.) The only additional mention of M.P. by M.S. was when she explained to the State 
prosecutor that she, H.S. and M.P. had exited the van to go tell Mrs. Swenson what had 
occurred. (R. 144:98-99.) 
At the end of the State's case, defense counsel moved for directed verdict as to all 
three counts of the information, but specifically asked the court to direct a verdict in favor 
of the defendant as to the count involving M.P. due to her lack of testimony at trial. (R. 
144:209.) The trial court denied defense counsel's motion by stating that, in the court's 
opinion, "there's enough evidence here from which one could draw a reasonable 
inference that the three girls saw what they saw and a reasonable inference that the one 
girl who has not testified is under the age of 14 . . .ff (R. 144: 211.) 
The trial court erred in its conclusion. Even granting all reasonable inferences to 
the State, the evidence adduced from M.S. and H.S. fails in any way to establish that M.P. 
actually saw the man in the car with an exposed penis. The entirety of the testimony was 
that H.S. and M.S. saw the man expose himself while they were playing board games in 
the family van with their friend M.P. No mention is ever made that M.P. ever looked out 
the window and noticed the "silver rusty" car or ever saw a man in that car with an 
exposed penis. Moreover, the prosecutor failed to elicit where M.P., M.S. and H.S. were 
positioned inside the vehicle, i.e., facing north, south, east or west, and thus no evidence 
that M.P. was ever in a position to see the man in the car. 
Even granting that M.P. was in the van on May 15, 1999, if she did not see the 
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man in the car with an exposed penis, a crucial element of the offense is missing, namely 
that the act did not occur in the presence of a child under 14 years of age. Without 
additional testimony by either M.P. herself or more detail from M.S. and H.S., the jury 
had absolutely no reasonable basis to conclude that M.P. saw a man with an exposed 
penis. Thus, the trial court erred by allowing Count III of the information go to the jury 
where the evidence to support the verdict was so completely lacking as to make any 
verdict rendered based on those facts plainly unreasonable and unjust. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Vance respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his convictions and remand this case for a new trial. At a minimum, Mr. Vance 
requests that this Court vacate the conviction with respect to count III, involving M.P. and 
order that the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the district court be 
amended to reflect such changes. 
SUBMITTED this 3*± day of May, 2001. 
I t lAUM^J^ 
JON N.ROMERO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Addendum A 
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Addendum B 
Set Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History- Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
b4 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Addendum C 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 
To: Shannon Romero 
From: Joey Finocchio 
Date: March 26, 2001 
Re: State vs. Stephen Vance 
Shannon, concerning the intake that you sent to me on 3/8/01 asking me to interview 
Karina Swenson and Denise Segura, mothers of the alleged victims of this case. I began with 
Mrs. Swenson it took numerous calls but I finally was able to speak with her. Our conversation 
began with me telling her who IAM and who I work for, I then asked if she would be willing to 
speak to me concerning the matters you had asked in your intake, Mrs. Swenson seemed 
agreeable until I began my questions at which point she stopped me and asked again who I was 
and who I work for? I again explained to her who IAM and who I work for, at which point she 
got some what upset and said she would not be willing to speak with me and stated she would be 
contacting someone at the D.A.'s office concerning me calling. At that point she hung up the 
phone. 
Concerning interviewing Mrs. Segura, I have made numerous calls and also personally 
went to Ms. Segura's home in Draper Utah and left a written not asking her to please contact me 
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Addendum F 
INSTRUCTION NO.\]Ly/ 
PRESUMPTION (W INNO( 'KNCR: 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until he/she is proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by 
the jun al plcastiir tail in a sittisianHtal essential pari of Ihe law intended, a*» iat as human agency is 
capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in the minds of the jury unless 
iiiinl uiiiil Ihe iiJiy is satisfied bryond a reasonable detiibi f (lie1 #\\\\\ of die defeinianl \nd m case of 
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This burden never shifts to a defendant kn line law ncvei imposes upon a defendant in :i CTIIIIIIJ.II 
case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until 
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in case of 
a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty.*•*Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
-that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence .*Tt must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt 
which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. -*—^ Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it, and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it 
must arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
case. 9mm 
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